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The immigration of Chinese to the Korean peninsula has a long history. According to legend 
it began at the very dawn of Korean history with the migration of Gija from Shang China to 
Gojoseon (old Korea). With the rise of modern nationalism in the 20
th
 century the Chinese 
contribution to Korean nationhood, gene pool and history has been downplayed and replaced 
by what has been termed racialist historiography, the attribution of a pure genetic origin to 
the Korean ‘race’. This has in turn led to open discrimination towards Chinese residents in 
South Korea (huaqiao) and the peculiar situation whereby Korea was until recently the only 
nation in East Asia that did not have a highly visible China town in its major cities
1
. The 
Chinese immigrants who settled in Korea tended to hide their origins or even assimilate to 
avoid discrimination. However, with the recent increase of China’s economic might, Korea 
has been forced to reassess its relations with China itself and also the Chinese residing in 
Korea. What this implies for the Chinese minority residing in Korea and what these new 
changing circumstances suggest for future Sino-Korean relations will be discussed in this 
article. 
 
Chinese Migration to Korea before the 19
th
 Century 
 
The long history of Sino-Korean contacts began during the early years of the Chinese Han 
dynasty (206 BC-220 AD).  The Chinese historian Sima Qian records that the king of the 
                                                 
1
 P.S. Yang and J.H. Lee, 차이나타운 없는 나라 - 한국 화교 경제의 어제와 오늘 (A country without a Chinatown-The 
yesterday and today of the Chinese-resident’s economy in Korea) (Seoul; Samsung Center for Economic 
Research, 2004). 
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Joseon (Korea: Chaoxian) named Man, who he claims was a leader of Chinese migrants from 
the Chinese kingdoms of Yan and Qi to Joseon (Shiji 115.2985), agreed to be an outer vassal 
of the emperor and was authorized to impose order on the barbarians (Man Yi) of the east. In 
return for his services the prefect of Liaodong was instructed to provide the king with 
material aid that enabled him to expand his kingdom over an area stretching thousands of li in 
all directions (Shiji 115.2986). Thus established in power with Chinese aid, Sima Qian 
records, the kings of the dynasty of Man (founder of the royal line of Joseon) consistently 
refused to present themselves at the imperial court to pay homage
2
. Throughout his narrative 
of the conflict between the Han Empire and Joseon, Sima Qian interestingly does not once 
apply to state of Joseon the epithet Man Yi (barbarian). As Gi notes, Sima Qian clearly 
regards the kingdom as being part of the sinocentric world order and the ruling dynasty at 
least, which is supposedly Chinese in origin, to be civilized
3
. Eventually a punitive invasion 
from China was launched to subdue Joseon and Han Wudi established four commanderies in 
what is now Northern Korea in 108 BC to rule the conquered Koreans. The impact of this 
early Han Chinese penetration into Korea was immense and led to the sustained sinification 
of all of Northeast Asia in succeeding centuries.  
 
During the subsequent Three Kingdoms period (ca. 1
st
 century BC-668 AD) of Korean 
history Chinese migration to Korea continued. According to the Samguksagi entry for the 38
th
 
year of King Bak Hyeogeose of Silla, it is claimed that refugees from Qin (China) settled in 
Jinhan, that is south-eastern Korea
4
. In the same Samguksagi the entry for the 11
th
 year of 
King Sansang of Goguryeo/Koguryo (in Northern Korea and southern Manchuria) records 
                                                 
2
 S.Y. Gi, Study of the ‘Dong Yi Zhuan’ of the Hou Han Shu centered on a comparison with the ‘Dong Yi 
Zhuan’ of the San Guo Zhi (Seoul: Baeksanjaryowon, 2005), p. 6, argues that the submission of Wei Man (the 
surname Wei does not appear in the Shiji, but only appears in a later 3
rd
 century source, the Weilue) to the 
imperial court was genuine and should be taken seriously and not simply as a diplomatic gesture. 
3
 Gi, Study of the ‘Dong Yi Zhuan’, p. 41.  
4
 Kim Pu-sik, Samguk-Sagi, tr. K.L. Lee (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1998), vol.1, p. 65.  
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that a certain Ha Yo from Northern China defected to Goguryeo with 1,000 migrants
5
. During 
the Goryeo period (918-1392 AD) the influx of a small number of Chinese into Korea 
continued. King Gwangjong (reigned 949-975 AD) employed Ssang Gi and other naturalized 
Chinese migrants to carry out his aggressive reform agenda. Later still during the Joseon 
dynasty (1392-1910 AD) the collapse of the Ming dynasty in China brought an influx of 
defeated Ming partisans from China into Northern Korea.  
 
The Coming of the Huaqiao in the 19
th
 Century 
 
Whereas these early Chinese who settled in Korea before the 19
th
 century were quickly 
absorbed into Korean mainstream society, a distinctly different Chinese settlement in Korea 
occurred during the second half of the 19
th
 century when Qing China in imitation of Western 
colonial powers thought to exercise a more intrusive, western style hegemony over Joseon
6
. 
The Qing merchant community that settled in Incheon from 1882 onwards did not 
immediately adapt or divest itself of its foreign identity but chose to form a separate Chinese 
community within Korea. After the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, 
Chinese merchants residing in Korea were confined to Seoul and three ports only (Incheon, 
Busan and Wonsan) and forbidden to move inland. In addition their once protected status in 
Korea, as citizens of Korea’s hegemon, received a blow due to the expansion of Japanese 
influence in Korea and the withdrawal of Qing military presence in Korea after 1894. This 
also significantly undermined the economic strength of the Chinese residents residing in 
Korea
7
.  
 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., p. 353. 
6
 See K.W. Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Choson Korea, 1850-1910 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 43-127. 
7
 P. Yang, 한국 화교 사회 변화의 연구 (Research on the transformation of the Chinese-resident society in Korea) 
(unpublished thesis: Kei Myung University, 2011), pp. 21-22.  
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The Huaqiao under Japanese Occupation 
 
During the Japanese occupation of Korea (1910-1945) and further Japanese expansion into 
Northern and eastern China, imperial Japan imported cheap labour from China into Korea as 
part of its concerted policy of developing what was then regarded as a ‘backward’ colony. 
The number of Chinese in Korea climbed to a respectable 67,794 people by 1930
8
. Friction, 
however, arose between Koreans and Chinese migrants leading to the tragic Manbosan 
incident (만보산사건)
9
. The Manbosan incident actually began as a land dispute between 
Chinese and Korean migrants in Manchuria that evolved into an armed clash involving 
firearms. No-one was killed in the incident which occurred in Manchuria. However, 
exaggerated reports of a massacre of ethnic Koreans in Manchuria by Chinese mobs, which 
appear to have been false, spread into Korea via newspapers. This precipitated angry 
‘reprisals’ in the form of pillaging and murder against Chinese residing in Korea and even 
Japan. The anti-Chinese sentiment was also apparently encouraged by the Japanese 
authorities who were eager to create excuses for further intervention in Northeastern China 
on the pretext of ‘protecting’ ‘Japanese citizens’ on Chinese soil (i.e. Korean migrants). The 
incident as terrible as it was did not seriously affect inter-community relations in Korea. 
Swift apologies were issued on both sides and a diplomatic solution was immediately sought 
to alleviate the plight of migrant communities (Koreans in Manchuria and Chinese in  
Korea)
10
. 
 
The Huaqiao in Post-independence Korea 
                                                 
8
 N. Yoon, 한국 화교의 정체성 연구 :부산지역 화교사회에 대한 설문조사를 중심으로 (Research on the Identity of 
Chinese residents in Korea: centered on the poll taken from Chinese residents in the Busan area) (unpublished 
thesis: Pukyung National University, 2008), p. 25. 
9
 Yang, 한국 화교 사회 변화의 연구, p. 23.  
10
 For more details on the Manbosan incident see Y.S. Park, 萬寶山事件硏究 (Research on the Manbosan 
Incident) (Seoul: Asia Cultural Society, 1978).  
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More serious to the status of Chinese in Korea was the upheavals that followed Korean 
independence in 1945. During the Korean War (1950-3), when Communist China intervened 
on behalf of North Korea, the Chinese residing in Korea became scapegoats for Chinese 
aggression against South Korea. The huaqiao, like the rest of Korea suffered crippling losses 
to property and livelihood during the war.  Even worse they were subjected to progressively 
worse discrimination and neglect after the war which prevented them from advancing the 
social ladder into more elevated professions and positions of influence. The most serious 
blow to the huaqiao in korea was probably the measures taken by the Park Jung-hee 
administration between 1962 and 1976. In 1962 radical currency reform measures were 
enacted by Park as part of the concerted effort to control the outflow of capital from Korea 
and to crack down on money laundering. The measures however had damaging effects on the 
huaqiao who were more actively involved in overseas trade. In 1976 further punitive 
measures were enforced that deprived the huaqiao of property rights and access to education 
within Korea
11
. As a result of these measures many huaqiao migrated out of Korea due to 
poverty or in search of better conditions
12
. For instance out of the 5,000 residents of 
Incheon’s once sprawling Chinese community only 500 decided to stay13. Of those that 
stayed many were forced to resign themselves to running Chinese restaurants and small 
business as part of an under-privileged and often despised minority
14
.  
 
The Perception of China and the Chinese among Koreans 
                                                 
11
 Entry by Y.H. Ju, 한국학중앙연구원 한국학대학원 교수 (Center for Korean Studies, Korean Studies Graduate 
School Lecturer) in Shindonga: 
http://shindonga.donga.com/docs/magazine/shin/2008/07/08/200807080500000/200807080500000_1.html 
12
 Yoon, 한국 화교의 정체성 연구, pp. 27-29; K.O. Kim, “Chinese in Korea”, in M. Ember, C.R. Ember, and I.A. 
Skoggard (eds.), Encyclopedia of diasporas: immigrant and refugee cultures around the world )New York: 
Springer, 2004), pp. 688-97, esp. p. 690.  
13
서울신문 (Seoul Sinmun) ‘자장면 원조 공화춘’ (Gonghwachun, the Origin of the Jjajangmyun), 17/03/2006. 
14
 Yang, 한국 화교 사회 변화의 연구, p. 25-6.  
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Such was the history of Chinese migration and settlement in Korea, which eventually led to 
the formation in the latter half of the 20
th
 century of a clearly disadvantaged and maligned 
minority within Korea. Interestingly however, in medieval Korea association with Chinese 
migrants was something to be proud of. The beginnings of Sino-Korean contacts were pushed 
back artificially to the very dawn of East Asian history via the legendary story of the 
migration of Gija (Jizi; 箕) to Korea during the Shang-Zhou dynastic transition. During the 
Goryeo and Joseon dynasties, the Korean government offered state sacrifices to this Gija, a 
Chinese sage who supposedly brought civilization to Korea
15
. Koreans, especially during the 
sinophile Joseon dynasty took pride in this association with China and Chinese civilization, 
which in their eyes and also they hoped in the eyes of the Chinese lifted their country above 
the status of Dongyi (eastern barbarians)
16
. As a matter of fact after the fall of the ‘legitimate’ 
Ming dynasty and its takeover by the ‘barbarian’ Manchus in the 17th century, the Yangban 
elite of the Joseon dynasty considered Korea to be the sole bastion of Chinese civilization or 
rather Neo-Confucian civilization and eagerly adopted for themselves the mantle of ‘Little 
China’ (소중화)17. 
 
The legend of Gija which played such an important role in the Joseon articulation of Korea’s 
self-image to the outside world before the 19
th
 century was without a doubt a fictitious story 
invented by the Chinese
18
 during the late Warring States or Han period in order to explain the 
                                                 
15
 The earliest reference to Gija and his fictitious ties with Joseon can be found in the Shangshu dazhuan (尚書
大傳) and Sima Qian’s famous Shiji, see J. Shim, "A New Understanding of Kija Chosŏn as a Historical 
Anachronism", Journal of Asian Studies, 62.2 (2002), pp. 271–305, especially 274-5. 
16
 For Sinocentrism and Chinese attitudes towards the ‘barbarians’ see H.J. Kim, Ethnicity and Foreigners in 
Ancient Greece and China (London: Duckworth, 2009), pp. 34, 60-69. 
17
 J.H. Kim Haboush, The Confucian Kingship in Korea: Yongjo and the Politics of Sagacity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 21-28. 
18
 Y. Bugin, Gojoseon Yoksa-Gogohakjuk Geyo (Introduction to the Historical and Archaeological Gojoseon), tr. 
H.J. Yi and B.D. Yi (Seoul: Sonamu, 1990), p. 116. As S.M. Nelson, “Archaeology of the Two Koreas”, in M. 
T. Stark (ed.), An Archaeology of Asia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 37-54, p. 49, argues, there is 
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high level of material culture (which was attributed to the civilizing influence left by Gija) 
that the Chinese encountered as they expanded east. It is revealing that the earliest stories 
about Gija mention no such immigration from China to Joseon on his part
19
 and the 
attribution of Chinese ancestry to the ancient rulers of Korea was part of the wider Chinese 
practice of ascribing a Chinese ancestor to all neighbouring, foreign peoples
20
. However, 
what is noteworthy is the extent to which this sinification of Korea in the Chinese 
imagination was fully embraced by the Koreans as part of their identity. The migration of 
small numbers of Chinese to Korea was almost without exception welcomed by the Korean 
ruling elite of all dynasties and time periods before the 19
th
 century. It was seen as an 
opportunity to absorb China’s ‘superior’ civilization and with the prevailing mood of 
sinocentrism and sadaejui (serving the great, i.e serving China
21
) during the Joseon dynasty 
even the confusion of Korea and China (that is regarding the two countries as part of the 
same civilized Confucian community) was at times encouraged.  
 
This remarkable love for everything Chinese was abruptly brought to an end by the intrusions 
of the Western colonial powers and Imperial Japan in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. China 
at least from 1950s onwards was no longer regarded as the fountain of all civilization, but 
increasingly despised as a poor, backward, communist country that had invaded Korea during 
the Korean War. The rejection of most aspects of Chinese influence
22
 and the rise of Korean 
nationalism (tinged with racialism that attributed a pure genetic origin to all Koreans 
(단일민족) and tried to reject historically attested injection of foreign blood into the Korean 
                                                                                                                                                        
nothing that can be identified as Shang or Zhou in eastern Liaodong and Korea in the archaeological record 
before the Warring States Period.  
19
 See B. Hinsch, “Myth and the Construction of Foreign Ethnic Identity in Early and Medieval China (Xiongnu, 
Xianbei and Koreans in China)”, Asian Ethnicity, 5.1 (2004), pp. 81-103, in particular 101 ff. for further details.  
20
 Kim, Ethnicity and Foreigners, pp. 137-39. 
21
 For a very balanced analysis of the Joseon-China tributary relations and Sadae before the 19
th
 century see 
Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade, pp. 29-35. 
22
 For instance the abrupt disconnect with the story of Gija founding Joseon and the removal of references to 
Gija in history books in South Korea, see D. Chen, “Domestic Politics, National Identity, and International 
Conflict: The case of the Koguryo Controversy”, Journal of Contemporary China, 21.74 (march 2012), p. 233. 
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gene-pool
23
) also led to the instinctive repugnance among Koreans of being mistaken for 
Chinese by outsiders or by the Chinese themselves. In this overwhelmingly nationalist 
political climate of post-independence Korea the foreignness of the Chinese residing in Korea 
was increasingly suspect and the loyalty or lack thereof of the huaqiao towards the Korean 
state became an issue. The Chinese community itself became torn due to conflicting identities 
that they had to negotiate. Were they nationalist Chinese (or Taiwanese), mainland Chinese 
or should they become naturalized Korean citizens?
24
 
 
The economic rise of China from the 1990s onwards and the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the PRC and South Korea in 1992
25
 brought about a slow but visible 
improvement in both the treatment and the economic well-being of Chinese residents in 
Korea that had hit an all time low in 1976. The fact that mainland China is now no longer the 
‘backwards, poor’ country that it used to be and the recognition among Koreans of this new 
wealth and power among the Chinese have both contributed to the mellowing of Korean 
attitudes (at least official government attitudes) towards the Chinese. This has had positive 
consequences for the Chinese community in Korea that had until recently been subjected to 
                                                 
23
 For a critique of this racialism in Korean historical scholarship see H.I. Pai, Constructing ‘Korean” Origins: 
A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories 
(Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2000). See also G.W. Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in 
Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).  
24
 See S.H. Jang, ‘이산민의 초국가성과 다층적 정체성 : 중국 위해의 한국화교에 대한 사례연구’ (The supra-national 
multifaceted identity of the Chinese Diaspora in Korea), 현대중국연구 (Modern China Research), 11.2 (2010), 
pp.263-97, in particular pp. 284-9, for the identity crisis among Chinese residing in Korea, having to negotiate 
their way between multiple identities: Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese. The strong anti-communism of post Korean 
War South Korea had also affected the attitudes of Chinese residing in Korea towards mainland China. The 
suspicion and hostility towards communist China was shared by both the native Koreans and the Chinese 
Diaspora in Korea. This was only slowly dispelled after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China 
and South Korea in 1992, which allowed Chinese residing in Korea to participate in trading activities with 
mainland China. See also Yoon, 한국 화교의 정체성 연구, pp. 58-70.  
25
 For a good analysis of this rise and what it implies see C. Horner, Rising China and its Postmodern Fate: 
Memories of Empire in a New Global Context (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2009), pp. 1-
21, 145-56, 183-91. For the history of the evolution of South Korea-China diplomatic and economic relations 
see J.H. Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007). 
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various levels of discrimination by mainstream Korean society
26
. It is, however, still very 
common for huaqiao who have resided for generations in Korea and are fluent in Korean to 
simply blend in and hide their Chinese origins. Although officially the huaqiao are now 
subjected to no open discrimination or maltreatment, the stigma of being ‘foreign’ and the 
fear of rejection or exclusion by one’s peers at school and colleagues in work places, if one’s 
identity as a huaqiao should be exposed, prevent many huaqiao from openly declaring their 
ethnic affiliation.  
 
Quite obviously this is a cautious response among the huaqiao to escape from the still 
pervasive prejudice towards Chinese in Korean society. The author himself can attest to the 
frequency with which Koreans in private discourse voice mild contempt (although more 
recently largely harmless and hardly malicious) for the Chinese using derogatory terms such 
as ‘Jjangkye’ to refer to Chinese in general. Fear of being excluded and othered still haunt the 
huaqiao for whom for generations Korea has been their primary home. In fact as the 
Chosunilbo reports 70% of the huaqiao households that have resided in Korea for multiple 
generations are now mixed families of both Chinese and Korean ancestry due to wide-spread 
inter-marriage between huaqiao and native Koreans
27
. The fact that even these huaqiao have 
felt a degree of exclusion from mainstream Korean society, should they openly flaunt their 
ethnic origin, is an indictment on the pernicious effects of nationalist and ethnocentric 
education long-favoured by the Korean state and in Koreans schools. That in Korean society 
being openly huaqiao still brings unwanted attention and a degree of negative publicity was 
best demonstrated by the recent sensational coverage of the alleged huaqiao origins of one of 
                                                 
26
 For specific instances see Y.J. Rhee, “Diversity within Chinese Diaspora:Old and New Huaqiao Residents in 
South Korea”, in J. Fernandez (ed.), Diasporas:Critical and Inter-Disciplinary Perspectives (Oxford: Inter-
Disciplinary Press, 2009), pp. 111-126, p. 115. 
27
 http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/08/04/2011080400138.html 
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Korea’s best known actresses Jeon Jihyun (전지현 ‘화교설’)28. Jeon had to vehemently deny the 
rumours, apparently because she believed that if people perceived her to be huaqiao that 
would erode her popularity and appeal as an actress
29
. 
 
The Changing Nature of the Chinese Community in Korea 
 
According to figures collected in 2005 these old huaqiao in Korea with non-PRC passports 
(i.e descendents of the original Chinese migrants from before the Korean War, mainly from 
the Shandong region of Northern China
30
) numbered some 25,099 people, residing mainly in 
Seoul (39%), Incheon (13%) and other major urban centers such as Busan (9%)
31
. However, 
their limited numbers have made their impact on Korean society relatively minimal and their 
poor visibility in Korean society, as discussed above, for various reasons continues to this 
day.  
 
Much more visible are the recent wave of legal and illegal, largely economic, migrants to 
Korea from the PRC. According to the Chosunilbo the number of non-Korean citizens 
residing in Korea passed the one million mark in 2009 and among them the Chinese from the 
PRC were the majority, making up 56.5 % of all foreigners residing in Korea. The growth in 
the number of Chinese in Korea has also led to the revival of Korea’s moribund Chinatown in 
                                                 
28
 For details see Kyunghyang Sinmum 
http://sports.khan.co.kr/news/sk_index.html?cat=view&art_id=200905131033574&sec_id=540101&pt=nv and 
http://www.thetimes.kr/news/article.html?no=3615 
29
 The only huaqiao who have successfully been accepted as ‘talents’ (Korean for actor-actress, media 
entertainer in general) and mainstream by the Korean media and entertainment industry are the actresses Ha 
Hee-Ra 하희라 and 주현미. Both of them are of a mixed heritage (Chinese father and Korean mother), married to 
native Koreans and have taken Korean nationality, abandoning their official status as huaqiao. Even so their 
huaqiao origins initially raised eyebrows among certain segments of Korean society.  
30
 Rhee, “Diversity within Chinese Diaspora”, pp. 111, 113. 
31
 Yoon, 한국 화교의 정체성 연구, pp. 30-1.  
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Incheon. The new Chinatown boasts some 25 Chinese restaurants (22 of which are run by 
Chinese), 13 Chinese stores and 40 other Chinese businesses
32
.  
 
One would then naturally expect this huge increase in the number of Chinese citizens in 
Korea to have a social and political impact on South Korea, possibly even providing China 
with the tool to exert some kind of influence Korean internal affairs. However, the numbers, 
impressive as they are, are in fact slightly deceptive. Of the 624,994 PRC citizens in Korea 
some 71 % (443,566) are ethnic Koreans from Yanbian in north-eastern China
33
. These 
ethnic Koreans from Yanbian due to their PRC education and sense of belonging to the 
Chinese state that their upbringing in China had fostered, caused somewhat of a stir in South 
Korea by professing their loyalty to China rather than to their ‘motherland’(that is Korea). 
The author of this article has personally encountered many instances of Yanbian Koreans 
declaring themselves to be Chinese (an affront to the nationalist/ethnocentric sentiments of 
some Koreans) without hesitation before a bewildered South Korean audience. Their sense of 
Chineseness is only strengthened by prejudice that they encounter from some South Koreans 
who discriminate against them
34
. Yet despite their love for china and their self-proclaimed 
Chinese identity the Yanbian ethnic Koreans, once in South Korea, generally tend to blend 
into Korean society as quasi-second-class Korean citizens and they have not been very vocal 
in advocating Chinese interests in Korea
35
.  
 
The deep divisions (political and ethnic) within the Chinese community in Korea have also 
somewhat lessened the likelihood of any unified political assertiveness among them in the 
                                                 
32
서울신문 17/03/2006.For more details about the current state of the Incheon Chinatown see 
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/04/16/2012041601767.html and 
http://www.ichinatown.or.kr/introduction/history.asp 
33
 http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/08/06/2009080600243.html 
34
 For a good example of this prejudice even in official media see 
http://www.ilyosisa.co.kr/news/article.html?no=17468 
35
 http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=2481497 
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near future. The huaqiao remain divided in their allegiance between the PRC and Taiwan
36
, 
while the ethnic Koreans from Yanbian are usually far from vocal and due to ethnic ties are 
much more receptive to and immersed in South Korean culture than other migrants from 
China
37
. The expectation therefore that the Chinese residing in Korea may somehow 
influence Sino-Korean relations and Korean policy making decisions with regard to China 
seem premature.  
 
New Obstacles to Sino-Korean Relations 
 
The rise of China and the growing Chinese confidence in their own strength have also 
brought to the fore new controversies that threaten the stability of Sino-Korean relations and 
also the well-being of Chinese residents in Korea. The most troubling of these controversies 
is surprisingly enough a dispute over ancient history. The revisionist Chinese claims to what 
the Korean public regards as historical Korean states such as Koguryo and Balhae (동북공정)38,  
has in recent years sparked an emotional response among nationalist Koreans and needlessly 
heightened anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. The claims to Koguryo and Balhae are part of 
China’s concerted effort to strengthen its historical-territorial claims39 on its borders and also 
                                                 
36
 Rhee, “Diversity within Chinese Diaspora”, pp. 116-7. 
37
 A spate of murders committed by an ethnic Koreans from Yanbian has recently generated some ill feeling 
towards Yanbian Koreans among South Koreans. It has also again generated some debate about the ‘identity’ of 
these migrants. Are they Chinese or Korean? See 
http://joongang.joinsmsn.com/article/aid/2012/04/23/7605023.html?cloc=olink|article|default,  
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2012041914284666453&outlink=1, 
http://www.kyeonggi.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=570388 and 
http://www.sisainlive.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=12966 
38
 This highly publicized and acrimonious dispute between China and Korea over ancient history is also 
mirrored by an equally acrimonious disagreement over more recent history between Korea and Japan which 
receives treatment in Kimijima Kazuhiko, “The Continuing Legacy of Japanese Colonialism: The Japan—South 
Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks,” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Censoring History: 
Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 
203-225. 
39
 These claims are in turn buttressed by the growing nationalist sentiments of the Chinese people. For Chinese 
nationalism see J. Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism”, in J. Unger (ed.), Chinese Nationalism (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 1-30, especially p. 17 ff. and P. Duara, “De-constructing the Chinese Nation”, in the 
same volume, pp. 31-55. For a critique of the pseudo-historical approach adopted to legitimize modern 
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to allay its own internal security concerns
40
. However, this assertiveness on the part of China 
has offended large sections of the Korean population in South Korea, who like their mainland 
Chinese counterparts were heavily indoctrinated by the East Asian version of state-sponsored, 
nationalist, pseudo-historical semi-propaganda
41
.  
 
Such disputes and also a host of other minor issues have left virtually no room for the 
Chinese minority in Korea to project a more positive image both of China and themselves to 
the Korean public. It has also limited their capacity to actively lobby for China’s interests 
within Korea. Rather surprisingly that role has been taken up by left-wing alignments in 
Korea, which had historically favoured communist North Korea and communist China. 
Along with their allies in the Korean media they have displayed a persistent anti-American 
and anti-Japanese approach, while usually toning down the rhetoric when affairs that would 
present China negatively to the Korean public appear
42
.  
 
This pro-Chinese stance among the influential left wing South Koreans has the potential to 
swing Korea in the direction of Beijing away from the current Korea-Japan-America 
                                                                                                                                                        
territorial claims see Q.E. Wang, Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to 
Historiography (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 121. See also K.C. Chang, 
“Reflections on Chinese Archaeology in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century”, Journal of East Asian 
Archaeology, 3.1-2 (2001), pp. 5-13. 
40
 For detailed analyses of this dispute over Koguryo and its significance see P.Hays Gries, “The Koguryo 
Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations today”, East Asia, 22.4 (winter 2005), pp. 3-17, and 
D. Chen, “Domestic Politics, National Identity, and International Conflict”, pp. 227-241. See also 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrei-Lankov/2233 and  http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yonson-Ahn/2631 for further 
discussion. 
41
 For excellent analyses of the dispute over ancient history between China and South Korea and the negative 
effects of nationalist indoctrination in both countries see G.H. Song, East Asia’s History Conflict, pp. 13-44; S.S. 
Lee, Mandeul eo jin godeh: geun-deh gukmingukga ui Dongasia iyagi (Created Antiquity: The Early Modern 
Nation-State’s story of East Asia) (Seoul: Samin, 2001), pp. 19-34,186-88; J.O. Lee, Goguryeo ui Yoksa (The 
History of Goguryeo) (Seoul: Gimyoungsa, 2005), pp.12-23. 
42
 Gyeonghyang Sinmun, Ohmy News, Hangyeoreh Sinmun, MBC News network, Pressian, Media Today, etc., 
all favour the left of the political spectrum and have shown a marked reluctance to criticize either the North 
Koreans or their Chinese patrons in Beijing. In contrast their criticisms of the US and Japan have been 
extremely vigorous. Most of the news agencies cited above for instance denied the North Korean involvement in 
the recent Chonanham incident and rapidly adopted the Chinese official position towards the incident while 
rejecting the position espoused by the South Korean government and most of the international community. Their 
influence among the younger generation of Koreans is also very strong and will in all likelihood contribute to 
the growing support for Chinese interests among younger Koreans in the future.  
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alliance
43
, with immense geopolitical implications. During the Sinophile Roh Moo-hyun 
presidency the ruling Uri party (the main left-wing coalition) consistently cultivated closer 
ties with Beijing at the expense of the traditional ties between the US and South Korea. While 
the left-wing was in power, according to one internal poll, among the new incoming 
legislators 63 percent were reported to have picked China as the most important nation for 
South Korea and expressed a dim view of the United States
44
. The change in government 
under the conservative Lee Myung-Bak presidency from 2008 onwards has definitely slowed 
the pace of this political drift in South Korea towards Beijing. However, should the left-wing 
regain power in this year’s presidential elections the drift towards Beijing among Korea’s 
political elite may recommence, regardless of the low esteem with which China is held 
among the Korean public in general.  
 
It is doubtful whether the Chinese community in Korea will have any role in advancing the 
cause of the pro-Chinese elements in Korean politics. However, what is clear is the fact that 
Sino-Korean relations remain highly volatile and the polarization of Korean politics
45
 spells 
danger for any overt signs of Chinese political assertiveness within Korea. If the Chinese 
residing in Korea were to be seen actively supporting a particular political movement within 
Korea that furthers China’s interests, this may well provoke a backlash from nationalists in 
Korean politics. The extraordinary potency of nationalism (based on race) that pervades 
Korean society and influences both the left and right spectrums of Korean politics, will in all 
likelihood continue to hinder the normal integration and political activity of the huaqiao in 
Korea in the foreseeable future.  
 
                                                 
43
 See J. Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 132. 
44
 Ibid.  
45
 See G. Rozman, “South Korea’s National Identity Sensitivity: Evolution, Manifestations and Prospects”, 
Korea Economic Institute: Academic Paper Series, 4.3 (march 2009), pp. 1-9, esp. pp.2-6.  
Provincial China, Vol. 4. No. 1 (2012) 
 
114 
 
Conclusion 
 
The contemporary influx of Chinese into Korea has numerous historical antecedents. One 
would then naturally expect a greater degree of tolerance and familiarity towards the Chinese 
from within Korean society. Yet, the politics of race or ‘racialism’ that has dominated both  
20
th
 century Korean statehood and Korean nationalist historiography has encouraged the 
notion of ethnic exclusivity at the expense of the Chinese minority (the huaqiao) residing in 
Korea. This led to open discrimination against the Chinese, especially in post Korean War 
South Korea, which was only somewhat discontinued after 1992 with the establishment of 
Sino-Korean diplomatic relations. The plight of the Chinese in Korea has significantly 
improved since then. However, the rising power of China and the expression of that new 
found confidence among the Chinese in the form of historical revisionism threaten to 
undermine the growing current of Pro-Chinese sentiment among the left-aligned political 
parties of South Korea. The ever-present nationalism of Korean cultural and political life also 
means that the full enfranchisement or independent political action among Chinese residing 
in Korea remains a difficult task. The current boom of the Incheon Chinatown and the growth 
in the number of Chinese visitors and workers in Korea all suggest that the importance of ties 
to China will only become greater in the Korea of the future. However, the likelihood of this 
eventually leading to the re-establishment within Korean society of the state sponsored 
‘China-worship’ that was practiced in pre 19th century Korea, is for the moment at least very 
slim. The nationalism that swept Korean society will not easily disappear and other 
geopolitical players, most notably the United States, now loom close to the Korean peninsula 
to limit the degree of China’s influence. How Korea will navigate its way through this 
difficult geo-political situation is the key issue of Korean politics of the future. Would it be 
too much to suggest that for Korea its future treatment of its long-neglected resident Chinese 
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population is a litmus test of how well Korea will weather the storm of China’s imminent 
rise?  
 
 
